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There is no consensus in the literature on the negative effect of corruption on 
countries’ ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Some countries 
simultaneously have high levels of corruption and FDI flows. In this study, we 
distinguish the effect of two types of corruption – arbitrary and pervasive – and 
the moderating role of corruption distance between the investor and host 
country on the ability to attract FDI. In an empirical study of FDI flows into Latin 
American countries, the results show that high pervasive corruption reduces the 
attractiveness of FDI and that corruption distance attenuates the negative effect 
of arbitrary corruption on FDI. The study contributes to the research on the 
effects of corruption and particularly to understanding the differentiated effects 
of the types of corruption and of corruption distance on FDI flows. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The influence of corruption on countries’ ability to 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) has been 
extensively analyzed in the literature, but with 
inconclusive results (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, 2008; Godinez & Liu, 2015; 
Ferreira et al., 2016). The dominant argument is that 
corruption has a negative impact on ability to attract 
FDI by increasing uncertainty and the costs of FDI 
(Smarzynska & Wei, 2000; Wei, 1998, 2000; Habib & 
Zurawicki, 2002; Voyer & Beamish, 2004; Egger & 
Winner, 2005). However, another side of the 
argument is that corruption facilitates FDI by oiling 
the wheels of transactions, which become more 
expeditious, and by bypassing institutional 
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inefficiencies (Huntington, 1968; Bardhan, 1997; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). The benefits of avoiding 
inefficient institutions through corruption could 
offset additional costs and uncertainty (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2008), although other authors have found 
no relationship between corruption and FDI (e.g., 
Hines, 1995). However, although the literature on the 
influence of corruption in FDI is vast, it has neglected 
two dimensions. On the one hand, distinguishing the 
type of corruption (exceptions in Rodriguez et al., 
2005; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Ferreira et al., 2016) 
and on the other hand, albeit less frequently, 
considering the corruption distance between the 
home country and host country (Habib & Zurawicki, 
2002; Godinez & Liu, 2015).  
Review of 
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Corruption, as an element of the institutional quality 
of countries, is an indicator of the ability to attract FDI 
(Kinoshita & Campos, 2004; Egger & Winner, 2005; 
Wernick et al., 2009; Zeghni & Fabry, 2009). More 
developed institutional environments, with 
consequent lower corruption levels, may encourage 
FDI by reducing risks, uncertainty and transaction 
costs (Ali et al., 2010; Chao & Kumar, 2010). 
Institutional insufficiencies like the lack of monitoring 
of legal systems (Lapalombara, 1994; Jeong & 
Weiner, 2012) or the existence of excessive or 
inefficient bureaucracy (Leff, 1964; LaPalombara, 
1994; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006) encourage resorting to 
abuse of public power to obtain private benefits. 
In internationalization, the greater the differences 
in corruption levels, the less likely multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) will know how to handle social 
pressures and the less likely they will be to make FDI 
(Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Nevertheless, some 
studies have shown that corruption distance, and 
perhaps its direction, differentiates the impact of 
corruption on FDI. Godinez and Liu (2015), for 
example, found that MNEs based in countries with 
relatively low corruption levels are not familiar with 
the formal and informal institutions associated with 
corruption, thus perceiving greater risk and 
uncertainty in FDI. On the other hand, companies 
based in countries with high corruption levels are not 
dissuaded by high corruption levels in host countries. 
In other words, on the one hand, there is the 
possibility of MNEs from low corruption countries 
finding it difficult to understand the values and norms 
of the market in which they wish to operate and the 
organizational legitimacy they should achieve when 
faced with corruption. On the other hand, MNEs from 
high corruption countries could view the situation 
differently, as they may have developed abilities to 
deal with corruption in their countries of origin 
(Godinez & Liu, 2015; Ferreira et al., 2016). 
In this study, we analyzed the influence of 
arbitrary corruption and pervasive corruption on FDI 
flows, gauging the moderating role of corruption 
distance between home and host country. 
Specifically, we evaluated whether the relationship 
between arbitrary and pervasive corruption and FDI 
flows is altered depending on the distance between 
the corruption levels in the home and host countries. 
We empirically observed FDI flows in Latin American 
countries from 2010 to 2014. With a sample of 473 
investments from 27 countries in 17 Latin American 
countries, we used Tobit regression models. We 
concluded that pervasive corruption has a negative 
impact on FDI flows and that corruption distance 
moderates the effect of arbitrary corruption on FDI 
flows. 
This study makes two contributions to the field. 
First, it extends our knowledge on the impact of 
corruption in the host country regarding its ability to 
attract FDI. Due to the contradictory results of other 
studies, further empirical demonstrations of the 
ability to discourage or stimulate FDI are justified. 
Latin American countries provide the context for the 
empirical testing. However, this study includes a 
special analysis of the type of corruption in FDI flows. 
Arbitrary corruption and pervasive corruption imply 
different configurations, predictably with different 
influences on FDI flows (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). 
The study also contributes to the still incipient 
research on the moderating role of corruption 
distance between the home and host countries, 
underlining the importance of institutional quality of 
the home country in the context of foreign 
investment. Corruption distance has been seen as 
dissuasive to FDI in that institutional differences 
increase the effort of multinationals to gather, 
interpret and organize the information required for 
FDI (Godinez & Liu, 2015). However, the direction in 
which the investment flows is a determining factor 
due to the possible competences acquired by MNEs 
based on their experience with dealing with 
corruption in their domestic environments. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
The increasing volume of FDI since the nineties has 
aroused growing interest in the academic community 
on the possible determinants of FDI flows (Daude & 
Stein, 2007; Ali, Fiess & Macdonald, 2010). Economic 
factors have traditionally been viewed as 
fundamental determinants of FDI flows (Mudambi & 
Navarra, 2002), including aspects such as the 
dimension and growth of the market, access to 
natural resources, the cost of labor, and inflation 
levels (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). However, 
differences in institutional structures in countries 
were either ignored or viewed as a secondary factor 
(Mudambi & Navarra, 2002). Nevertheless, 
institutions are critical elements in companies’ 
decisions on FDI, and developed institutional 
environments attract FDI because they reduce 
transaction costs (Mudambi & Navarra, 2002; 
Gelbuda et al., 2008). The institutional quality of 
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countries is fundamental for their capacity to attract 
FDI IDE (Bevan et al., 2004; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 
2007; Wernick et al., 2009). Institutional quality 
encompasses element ranging from governmental 
stability, lack of social tension, compliance with the 
law, economic development, sophistication of 
education and incorporation of knowledge (Peng & 
Heath, 1996; Peng, 2003; Ferreira et al., 2016). 
Corruption is a face of institutionally less 
developed environments. Corruption has a negative 
effect on company performance (Doh et al., 2003; 
Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). It 
may be the result of institutional insufficiencies 
(Ferreira et al., 2016). A common example of how 
institutional gaps give rise to corruption is a flaw in 
legal systems when it comes to monitoring laws, 
compliance with the law and punishment for offenses 
(Karnani, 2007). The lack of monitoring and a flawed 
institutional system are incentives for corruption 
(Jeong & Weiner, 2012). On the other hand, 
sophisticated legal and political institutions act as 
barriers to corruption, formalizing the costs 
associated with corruption in the form of fines 
(Galang, 2012) and legal proceedings. Therefore, 
institutionally sophisticated frameworks make it 
possible to attract MNEs and investments, while the 
existence of institutional gaps and inefficiencies 
discourage companies from investing. 
Despite the argument and current conviction that 
corruption harms development, the effect of 
corruption on attracting FDI is unclear. 
Stereotypically, countries with high corruption levels 
tend to attract less FDI (Wei, 1998). This is because 
corrupt countries do not offer the same conditions of 
access to markets as all their competitors, preferring 
those who are willing to pay bribes (Wei, 1998). 
However, another perspective proposes that 
corruption facilitates business, making transactions 
less expeditious by overcoming institutional 
deficiencies (Bardhan, 1997; Huntington, 1968). In 
these cases, corruption can effectively facilitate FDI 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). For example, bribing civil 
agents to obtain licenses triggers market mechanisms 
and incentives for better functions of bureaucratic 
systems (Lui, 1985). In other words, corruption could 
constitute an advantage against the risks of the 
political system, as it helps to mitigate risks such as 
expropriation (Leff, 1964). Thus, a positive effect of 
corruption in attracting FDI will occur especially in 
countries with less developed institutions and 
excessive or inefficient regulations (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2006; Leff, 1964). In countries with excessive 
regulations and other administrative constraints, 
corruption can function as a “friendly hand” to 
encourage FDI (Egger & Winner, 2005). In short, the 
benefits of bypassing deficient institutions through 
corruption can offset additional costs and 
uncertainties. 
2.1. Arbitrary and pervasive corruption 
 in the host country and FDI flows 
Corruption can divided into two types: arbitrary and 
pervasive. Arbitrary corruption has to do with the 
uncertainty associated with corrupt acts (Rodriguez 
et al., 2005; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008), a counterpoint to 
pervasive corruption, which reflects the degree of 
institutionalization of corruption, i.e., its transversal 
nature in the public sector (Rodriguez et al., 2005) or 
even society. Arbitrary corruption represents the 
uncertainty associated with corruption. When MNEs 
are entering foreign markets, they do not know 
whether they will be asked to pay bribes to achieve 
their goals, such as public contracts or licensing 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). Wei (1998) showed that 
uncertainties related to corruption have a greater 
influence on the ability to attract FDI than the level of 
corruption, when analyzed separately. Indeed, the 
difficulties involved in MNEs complying with legal 
requirements, norms and regulations will be greater 
when arbitrary corruption levels in host countries are 
high (Rodriguez et al., 2005). 
Arbitrary corruption in the host country will have 
a negative effect on decisions to make FDI. Arbitrary 
corruption hinders MNEs when it comes to 
estimating, for example, the likelihood of their being 
asked to pay bribes or the cost of these bribes. There 
is also the possibility that different elements of 
political, legal and bureaucratic agents will ask for 
bribes independent of one another (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2008). Therefore, arbitrary corruption increases the 
difficulty of planning the exact costs of a new FDI 
operation (Rodriguez et al., 2005). This is why 
arbitrary corruption is often referred to using the 
vulgar term “disorganized corruption” (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1993) due to the uncertain possibility of 
bribery and the form it will take, the possibility of 
independent bribes and uncertainty regarding the 
effective outcome of a bribe (Doh et al., 2003; 
Rodriguez et al., 2005). When there is less arbitrary 
corruption, there will be less uncertainty associated 
with the operation. Therefore, a decision will be 
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made to invest in this territory (Wei, 1998). 
Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of arbitrary corruption 
in the host country are negatively related to the 
ability to attract FDI. 
Pervasive corruption, on the other hand, can be 
understood as the known cost of corruption. In other 
words, the expectable and predictable cost of a 
certain operation or transaction (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2008). This kind of corruption is based on the idea 
that a bribe, once paid, ensures the delivery of the 
goods, or the effectiveness of the agreed transaction, 
also known as organized corruption (Elliot, 1997). 
When investing in countries with high pervasive 
corruption, companies already expect that they will 
be obliged to pay bribes either to public agents who 
handle administrative processes to lighten the 
burden of bureaucracy or to government agents to 
obtain public contracts and licenses (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2008). In any case, these costs or charges can be 
expected and estimated beforehand. Therefore, we 
understand pervasive corruption as a measurement 
of external institutional pressures on companies to 
practice acts of corruption (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). 
Although pervasive corruption reflects the known 
cost of corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008), recurring 
payments increase costs (Meyer, 2001) and reduce 
the expected return on investments by MNEs, 
discouraging foreign investment. 
Hypothesis 2: Higher pervasive corruption levels in 
the host country are negatively related to the 
ability to attract FDI. 
2.2 Corruption distance 
Institutional differences between countries make it 
more difficult for MNEs to gather, interpret and 
organize information required for FDI. These 
differences discourage FDI and conflicts can even 
emerge between the need for local adaptation and 
the internal structure of MNEs (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 
2007). Moreover, the differences between 
corruption levels in the home and host country can 
increase the risk and costs of FDI. Conceptually, we 
can refer to these differences between countries as 
distance. The concept of distance has bene used to 
refer to how cultures differ between countries (e.g., 
Kogut & Singh, 1988) and how institutions differ 
(Hernández & Nieto, 2015). We refer here to 
corruption distance as the difference between the 
level of corruption in the public sector between FDI 
home and host countries, in accordance with Eden 
and Miller (2004). 
Specific characteristics of home countries can also 
influence the cost and willingness of MNEs to indulge 
in corrupt practices (Godinez & Liu, 2015). The 
corruption level of home countries at least partly 
determines the sensitivity of MNEs regarding 
corruption in host countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). 
For instance, MNEs from countries with laws against 
corruption abroad might tend to avoid investing in 
countries with high corruption levels, while MNEs 
with headquarters in corrupt countries will not be 
reticent about investing in countries with similar 
levels of corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). Likewise, 
MNEs located in low corruption countries will 
probably avoid investing in countries with high 
corruption rates (Habib & Zurawicki, 2001) due to 
their limited knowledge concerning how to deal with 
corruption. In these cases, companies have not 
learned how to deal with corruption in their own 
domestic markets (Pajunen, 2008). This means that 
corruption is an unfamiliar phenomenon to them and 
leads them to decide not to invest (Driffield et al., 
2013). In other words, companies from less corrupt 
countries have not developed a corruption capability 
(Ferreira et al., 2016). 
If institutional differences and different levels of 
corruption between the host and home countries 
discourage FDI, it is important to understand whether 
there are additional effects of corruption distance 
between countries. Countries can be characterized 
by different levels of arbitrary corruption, a 
phenomenon that leads to high levels of uncertainty 
(Ferreira et al., 2016). Therefore, arbitrary corruption 
alone dissuades investment (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008), 
with no expected growth of uncertainty due to a 
greater corruption distance. Arbitrary corruption 
involves, for example, corrupting members of 
government or other political elites, judges and 
bureaucrats who use their power of discretion to 
exploit legal gaps. These forms of corruption do not 
seem to have an impact on the decision to invest 
because foreign investors are aware of the problem, 
even if they cannot measure it. In other words, the 
growing uncertainty or risk that could be predictable 
by greater corruption distance does not effectively 
generate further reductions in investments. 
Companies from corrupt countries could actually gain 
an advantage in operations in other highly corrupt 
countries as they may have the knowledge to deal 
with arbitrary corruption dimensions. 
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In short, if the level of uncertainty associated with the 
existence of arbitrary corruption, added to the 
uncertainty created by the potential emerging nature 
or transition of markets is not sufficient to dissuade 
investment, it is not expected that corruption 
distance will potentiate this dissuasive effect and, on 
the contrary, attenuate any possible negative effect 
of arbitrary corruption. An explanation by Godinez 
and Liu (2015) is that in conditions of great 
uncertainty, companies tend to use entry modes with 
greater control on operations abroad, which mean 
higher investments. 
Hypothesis 3: Corruption distance between home 
and host country attenuates the negative 
relationship between arbitrary corruption and FDI 
flow. 
As stated above, pervasive corruption is 
institutionalized in a set of practices and norms that 
have to be adapted to customs, including acts of 
bribery (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Therefore, MNEs 
need to incur costs to adapt to informal corruption 
practices (Egger & Winner, 2005). However, adapting 
to norms and practices requires specific capabilities 
and knowledge of the host country (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2008). Nevertheless, there is less knowledge when 
the corruption distance is greater and MNEs are less 
capable of dealing with the pressures of operating in 
a corrupt domain (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Investors 
intending to operate in pervasive corruption 
countries with high levels of corruption distance face 
higher costs and risks. Thus, greater corruption 
distance reduces an MNE’s ability to adapt to the 
norms and practices of the host country, reducing the 
likelihood of FDI. 
Hypothesis 4: The corruption distance between the 
home and host countries intensifies the negative 
relationship between pervasive corruption and FDI 
flow. 
3. METHOD 
Corruption in Latin America is considered widespread 
and deeply rooted (Godinez & Liu, 2015). Despite 
high corruption, significant FDI have been made in 
the region from diverse sources, predominantly from 
countries with relatively lower corruption levels, 
meaning more developed countries. FDI flows into 
Latin America have increased not only because of the 
attractive market (with a population of over six 
hundred million and a growing middle class, albeit in 
different ways), but also because Latin American 
countries are undergoing a period of pro-market 
transformations (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009). In 
other words, their institutional systems have 
improved, with more formality and efficiency. Even 
so, great heterogeneity persists among Latin 
American companies and different levels of economic 
and institutional development. 
3.1 Sample 
The sample used in the study included FDI flows into 
17 Latin American countries from 2010 to 2014 from 
27 home countries. The host countries are Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and 
Tobago and Uruguay. The home countries are South 
Africa, Germany, Argentina, Belgium, Bermuda, 
Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Spain, the 
USA, Guatemala, the Netherlands, India, Italy, Japan, 
Luxemburg, Mexico, Norway, Panama, Peru, the UK, 
Russia, Switzerland, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
Although the number of host countries is limited, the 
number of observations totaled 473 pairs of 
home/host countries. Of these 473 observations, 405 
are for FDI flows from less corrupt to more corrupt 
countries, and 68 FDI flows are from more corrupt to 
less corrupt countries. 
3.2. Variables 
The dependent variable of our study is the natural 
logarithm of the value of FDI flows, measured in 
millions of dollars, adding a unit, considering cases in 
which reported net flow was equal to zero. Net flows 
of FDI in Latin American Countries from 2010 and 
2014 were used. These flows were taken from the 
publication of the Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC) for 2016. 
The two independent variables in our study are 
arbitrary corruption in the host country and pervasive 
corruption. The arbitrary corruption variable in the 
FDI host country was measured using the standard 
deviation of the corruption perception index (CPI) of 
Transparency International. The standard deviation 
of this indicator represents the variation in the scores 
attributed to a given country. This variation reflects 
the uncertainty regarding the perceived corruption 
level, serving as a proxy for arbitrariness (see Ferreira 
et al., 2016; Bogmans & Jong, 2011). 
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Pervasive corruption was operationalized by the 
measurement proposed by Uhlenbruck et al. (2006), 
using data from the Executive Opinion Survey of the 
World Economic Forum, available in the Global 
Competitiveness Report for 2010 and 2015. This 
measurement is based on the average responses to 
the five components of the following question: In 
your country, how common is it for firms to make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes in 
connection with (1) imports and exports; (2) public 
utilities; (3) annual tax payments; (4) awarding of 
public contracts and licenses; (5) obtaining favorable 
judicial decisions? Although in the original report the 
scale of responses varies from 1 (very common) to 7 
(never occurs), in this study, we have inverted the 
scale for better interpretation, with the lower values 
meaning less likelihood of requests for bribes. 
Corruption distance between home and host 
country is the difference between the value of the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of the home 
country and the value of the CPI of the host country, 
using data from International Transparency. A similar 
measurement was used by Hernández and Nieto 
(2015), but applied to institutional distance. 
Control variables 
We also included a set of control variables with 
regard to the country. These variables are generally 
considered in gravitational models, which have 
proved useful when it comes to explaining FDI flows 
(Wei, 2000; Bevan et al., 2004; Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2008). The bureaucracy of the host country is a 
reflection of institutional insufficiency, as a bloated 
bureaucracy is a barrier to FDI (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 
2007; Godinez & Liu, 2015). The bureaucracy of the 
host country was measured using the value, in days, 
of the time required to create a new business, with 
data collected from the Doing Business Project of the 
World Bank, available in the Global Competitiveness 
Report. 
Tab. 1 
Description of variables 
Variables Mensuration Source 
Influxo de IDE Logaritmo natural dos influxos de IDE no país receptor, em milhões de 
dólares 
Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC, 2016) 
Independent Variables 
Arbitrary corruption in host 
country 
Standard deviation of Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Transparency International (2010-14) 
Pervasive corruption of 
host country 
Average response to the five components of the following question: “In your 
country, how common is it for firms to make undocumented extra payments 
or bribes in connection with (a) imports and exports; (b) public utilities; (c) 
annual tax payments; (d) awarding of public contracts and licenses; (e) 
obtaining favorable judicial decisions?” Scale varies from (very common) to 7 
(never occurs). The values were inverted for better interpretation. 
Global Competitiveness Report (2010-14) 
Corruption distance Dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when corruption levels in the home 
country are lower than in the host country, and 0 when corruption levels in 
the home country are higher than in the host country. 
Transparency International (2010-2014) 
Controls Variables 
Bureaucracy of host 
country 
Time needed to create a new business, in days. Global Competitiveness Report (2010-14) 
Geographical distance 
from home to host country 
Physical distance in kilometers between capitals of pair of home and host 
countries 
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) 
GDP host country Natural logarithm of the value of GDP in millions of dollars World Development Indicators, do Banco 
Mundial (2010-14) 
Presence of FDI in host 
country 
Weighted average of responses to the following question: “In your country, 
how predominant is the ownership of companies by foreign capital?” The 
scale varies from 1 (extremely rare) to 7 (highly predominant). 
Global Competitiveness Report (2010-14) 
Tax burden of host country Combination of percentage of tax on profit, percentage of tax on work and 
other taxes. 
Global Competitiveness Report (2010-14) 
Source: Prepared by the authors 
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The geographical distance between home and host 
country facilitates FDI measurement, as the greater 
the distance, the higher the cost of transport and 
consequently more incentive for FDI (Wei, 2000). In 
this study, we used physical distance in kilometers 
between the capitals of the pairs of home and host 
countries (see Ferreira et al., 2016), available in the 
Geodist database of the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives 
et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the host 
country is a reflection of the dimension of the market 
and its attractiveness (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; 
Buckley et al., 2007). In this study, we used the 
natural GDP logarithm of the host countries, available 
in the World Development Indicators database of the 
World Bank. A market can also be more attractive if 
other MNEs have invested in it, as this investment 
reduces uncertainty regarding investments in these 
countries (Campos & Kinoshita, 2003). The presence 
of FDI in the host country variable was 
operationalized with the weighted average of 
responses to the question “In your country, how 
predominant is the ownership of companies by 
foreign capital?”, available in the Executive Opinion 
Survey of the World Economic Forum, collected from 
the Global Competitiveness Report. The scale of 
responses ranges from 1 (extremely rare) to 7 (highly 
predominant). Finally, the attractiveness of a host 
country for FDI can also be influenced by the tax 
burden (Slamrod, 1990). The tax burden of the host 
country was operationalized through a combination 
of the percentage of tax on profit, percentage of tax 
on work and other taxes, using data from the Doing 
Business Project of the World Bank, available in the 
Global Competitiveness Report. 
3.3. Analysis procedures 
To gauge the impact of arbitrary and pervasive 
corruption on FDI and the moderating effect of 
corruption distance, we used the Tobit statistical 
regression model. It is adequate because the 
dependent variable, the natural FDI logarithm, has 
non-negative values, i.e., it is censored to the left 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). Given the existence of 
logarithmic variables on both sides of the equation, 
this model is referred to as being double-log (Wei, 
2000). 
4. RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics, median and 
standard deviation of the variables and their 
correlations. The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were 
tested to gauge possible problems of multicollinearity 
of the variables. The tests did not have significant 
results. 
Table 3 shows the results of the regression to test 
the hypotheses. Model 1 includes only the control 
variables. Models 2 to 5 test the hypotheses and 
Model 6 is the full model. Model 2 presents the 
results for the test of Hypothesis 1, suggesting that 
arbitrary corruption in host countries would 
negatively influence FDI flows. The resulting 
coefficient is not statistically significant, and H1 was 
not confirmed. This result does not corroborate the 
position in the literature regarding the importance of 
arbitrary corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008), 
affirming that arbitrary corruption has a negative 
impact on attracting FDI. Investors may not manage 
to plan their costs beforehand or the probability of 
being asked for bribes in countries where they intend 
to invest. This could at least partly explain the non-
confirmation of the hypothesis. 
Tab. 2 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. FDI flow 2.312 0.882 1.000        
2. Arbitrary corruption host country  3.258 1.732 -0.085 1.000       
3. Pervasive corruption host country 6.230 0.928 -0.143** 0.031 1.000      
4. Corruption distance 0.850 0.359 .108* -0.061 0.359** 1.000     
5. Bureaucracy of host country 32.069 28.835 0.121** 0.412** 0.103* 0.098* 1.000    
6. Geographic distance between home 
and host countries 
6903.504 4174.965 0.100* -0.056 -0.133** 0.205** 0.182** 1.000   
7. GDP host country 10.996 0.696 0.645** -0.043 -0.114* 0.170** 0.303** 0.379** 1.000  
8. Presence of FDI in host country 4.860 0.745 0.078 0.104* -0.650** -0.307** -0.263** -0.012 0.071 1.000 
9. Tax burden of host country 54.270 21.935 0.315** 0.074 0.393** 0.165** 0.178** 0.080 0.411** -0.251** 
* p <0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Source: Prepared by the authors 
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Hypothesis 2 is tested in Model 3, proposing a 
negative influence of pervasive corruption on FDI 
flows. The hypothesis was confirmed with a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient (β=-0.233, 
p<0.01) for FDI flows. Thus, the higher the levels of 
pervasive corruption, the lower the FDI flow. It may 
be that the expected cost of additional 
undocumented payments for a transaction and the 
certainty of their recurrence makes MNEs hesitant 
about making investments (Ferreira et al., 2016; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). 
Model 4 tests H3, which proposes a moderating 
effect of corruption distance between the home and 
host country with regard to arbitrary corruption and 
FDI flows. The coefficient is statistically significant 
(β=0.083, p<0.05), confirming the hypothesis. The 
result of the interaction term indicates that the 
negative impact of corruption is attenuated by 
corruption distance. In other words, the greater the 
corruption distance, the less the sensitivity of FDI will 
be to arbitrary corruption. 
Finally, Model 5 tests the moderating effect of 
corruption distance between the home and host 
countries regarding the relationship between 
pervasive corruption and FDI. The result is not 
statistically significant to confirm the proposed 
hypothesis. Corruption distance would imply costs 
and effort in addition to those already known for 
pervasive corruption. This would make the operation 
riskier and more uncertain. However, in this study, it 
was not possible to verify the idea that the difference 
between the corruption level of home and host 
countries would accentuate the already negative 
relationship between FDI flows and pervasive 
corruption, corroborating Habib and Zurawicki 
(2002). 
5. DISCUSSION AND FINAL COMMENTS 
This study contributes to the literature on the impact 
of corruption on FDI flows along two lines. On the one 
hand, it distinguishes between arbitrary and 
pervasive corruption. On the other hand, it 
scrutinizes the corruption distance between home 
and host countries. In other words, we propose that 
to understand how corruption levels can affect the 
attractiveness of countries and MNEs’ decisions to 
invest in them, we also need to look at corruption 
distance. The statistical study was conducted at the 
national level, with data on Latin American countries. 
This study therefore expands the extant literature on 
types of corruption (e.g., Uhlenbruck et. al., 2006; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008) and studies on corruption 
distance (Godinez & Liu, 2015). 
Most existing research has concluded that 
corruption effectively discourages foreign investment 
(Judge et al., 2011). However, our study does not fully 
corroborate the outcomes of previous studies. The 
diverging results may be at least partly due to our 
considering corruption not as a single dimension but 
because we distinguish between kinds of corruption. 
The results on FDI flows into Latin America from 27 
countries showed that higher pervasive corruption 
Tab. 3 
Results of the regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Arbitrary corruption in host country  -0.028  -0.096**  -0.065 
Pervasive corruption in host country   -0.233***  -0.258*** -0.215** 
Corruption distance    -0.212 0.350 0.320 
Arbitrary corruption host country * corruption distance    0.0863**  0.057 
Pervasive corruption host country * corruption distance      -0.024 -0.054 
Bureaucracy of host country  -0.002*** 0.001 -4.957*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002 
Geographic distance between home and host countries -3.425*** -3.488*** -3.768*** -3.704*** -4.095*** -4.169*** 
 GDP host country (log) 0.881*** 0.861*** 0.866*** 0.845*** 0.843*** 0.824*** 
Presence of FDI in host country 0.042 0.064 -0.153** 0.092 -0.145* -0.107 
Tax burden in host country 0.003* 0.003** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
N 473 473 473 473 473 473 
χ2 377.561*** 381.069*** 406.413*** 390.227*** 415.797*** 421.118*** 
Log. Likelihood -483.948 -483.026 -476.159 -480.559 -473.743 -472.389 
Akaike Criterion 981.896 982.052 968.319 981.117 967.486 968.779 
Dependent variable: Log IDE país receptor  
Note: * p <0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Source: Prepared by the authors 
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levels reduce the ability to attract FDI. This is in 
keeping with most research on the theme (see, for 
example, Rodriguez et al., 2005). Nevertheless, we 
did not identify a significant effect between arbitrary 
corruption and FDI flows. This is in opposition to the 
proposals of Uhlenbruck et. al. (2006) and Cuervo-
Cazurra (2008). Apparently, firms that invest in Latin 
American countries are not dissuaded by arbitrary 
corruption. A possible explanation for this is that this 
type of corruption is already expected by companies 
that do not succeed in estimating the real impact of 
this kind of corruption on their operations, precisely 
due to its random and discriminative nature. In other 
words, in the Latin American context, it may be more 
difficult to evaluate, understand and identify 
arbitrary corruption compared with pervasive 
corruption. 
However, our study also shows that we need to 
analyze corruption distance. When investigating the 
moderating effect corruption distance in the 
relationship between FDI flows and arbitrary and 
pervasive corruption, we found different results for 
each type of corruption. If, on the one hand, there is 
a statistically significant effect in the relationship 
between pervasive corruption and FDI flows, in the 
relationship between arbitrary corruption and FDI, 
corruption distance acts as a mitigating effect. This 
means that although investors, in situations of 
corruption distance, continue to fear the effects of 
corruption at the heart of their organizations, they 
will not be deterred by arbitrary corruption in host 
countries. This result is in keeping with and 
strengthens the notion regarding the analysis of the 
impact of arbitrary corruption on FDI in isolation. In 
other words, countries that invest in Latin America 
will apparently not be dissuaded by arbitrary 
corruption. This reduced fear is due to the fact that 
scarce institutional familiarity in host countries, in 
comparison with home countries, does not add 
uncertainty to an already uncertain market (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2008). Another possible explanation is that 
the attractiveness of and the profit expected from 
international operations justify the risk of corruption 
(Bardhan, 1997; Huntington, 1968). Meanwhile, 
investment in situations of pervasive corruption does 
not appear to be mitigated or potentiated by 
corruption distance. It may be that the dissuasive 
force of pervasive corruption justifies the absence of 
significant moderation. 
A dimension that may be relevant to the study of 
the effects of corruption, possibly like other 
institutional inefficiencies, is the direction of 
corruption (Godinez & Liu, 2015) and the possibility 
of companies developing what could be called a 
corruption capability. In other words, companies 
could develop a capability for dealing with corruption 
in their domestic markets. Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 
(2008) call this, in the typology of Dunning’s OLI, an 
ownership advantage. In this measurement, it would 
be interesting to understand how companies from 
more corrupt countries managed to use this 
capability in their international expansion. 
5.1 Limitations and suggestions for future studies 
This study has limitations. First, given the complex 
and multifaceted nature of corruption, it is difficult to 
measure it precisely as it is difficult to persuade 
managers to participate in the study. Thus, the use of 
secondary and general data on the perception of 
corruption does not allow the identification of the 
different facets that corruption might assume, nor is 
it possible to gauge the actual corruption levels that 
exist. Future studies, using qualitative methodologies 
and, especially, based on questionnaires, could shed 
further light on the phenomenon of corruption. 
The use of secondary data, albeit from reliable 
sources, imposes further limitations. The number of 
observations was based on a relatively small group of 
host countries, making it necessary to cover a period 
of five consecutive years. However, it is important to 
highlight that we did not conduct longitudinal 
analyses given that the hypotheses did not forecast 
effects over time. Even so, it could be important to 
understand how improvements in the institutional 
environment, where corruption is found, might 
positively influence countries’ ability to attract 
foreign investments. 
It is important to note that most FDI flows into 
Latin America are from countries that are more 
institutionally developed, with lower corruption 
levels. In other words, the analysis might have a bias 
towards investments from less corrupt to more 
corrupt countries. However, it would be interesting 
to observe the opposite effect in greater detail when 
home countries have higher corruption levels than 
host countries, i.e., when home countries are more 
corrupt than the host countries that receive foreign 
direct investments. 
Although there is already substantial knowledge 
on the effects of corruption, much research remains 
to be done. For instance, future studies could analyze 
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the economic consequences of corruption, such as its 
effect on the composition of FDI (Smarzynska & Wei, 
2000). Companies with market orientation (which 
Dunning called market seeking) may be subject to 
different corruption levels than companies that use 
strategic asset seeking. These analyses also involve 
scrutinizing the trade-offs of the cost and benefits of 
becoming involved in corruption (Ferreira et al., 
2016). 
To conclude, institutional factors are important to 
MNEs’ investment decisions. This importance is 
greater when we analyze developing and Latin 
American countries, as institutional immaturity 
increases transaction costs and risk levels (Ali et al., 
2010). Corruption stems from institutional 
insufficiencies and causes uncertainty in 
internationalization. Our analysis of FDI flows to Latin 
American countries led to the conclusion that 
corruption distance mitigates the negative effect of 
arbitrary corruption of the host country in FDI flows. 
On the other hand, regardless of the direction of the 
investment, the pervasive corruption of host 
countries alone has a negative impact on FDI, 
suggesting that organized and recurring (or 
pervasive) corruption dampens FDI flows. 
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